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Since the 1980s welfare state institutions have undergone profound changes based on the principles of New Public Management (NPM). These changes were brought on by neoliberal criticism at the rigid, bureaucratic, inefficient and paternalistic nature of the welfare state. Led by the U.S. and the U.K. governments started incorporating the NPM doctrine: privatization, decentralisation and accountability (). Public utilities became privatized and liberalized and subsequently had to compete in ‘Quasi Markets’ (Bartlet and LeGrand, 1993). The state assumed a steering role aimed at guarding public values and ensuring a free market with open competition. 
	 The introduction of NPM led to a stream of research into the performance of privatized utility markets in terms of free competition, service quality, cost reduction, incomes and price levels (e.g. Frydman et al 1999; Galal et al 1994; Martin & Parker 1995;  Newberry & Pollit 1997; Ross, 1990; Boylaud & Nicoletti 2000). In the wake of accidents and crises in privatized public utilities, most notably the California energy crisis (2000 and 2001) and the UK train accidents in Southall (1997), Ladbrooke Grove (1999), Hatfield (2000) and Potters Bar (2002), much attention has been paid to the question whether NPM affects public values such as safety. In the case of the British Railways numerous researchers and inquiries suggested the privatization contributed to unsafe working conditions and methods because profits came before safety (Hutter 2001; Wolmar, 2001; Mathieu 2003; Muttram, 2003; Smith 2003; Cole & Cooper 2006, 2007). According to Hutter (2001) after privatization decision making was increasingly based on cost benefit analyses without taking the utility function into account. Certain investments in maintenance and safety were not made because they were either too expensive - for instance protective equipment and devices - or could hamper production rates - for instance running less trains to make the railway track safer. In addition, increased pressure to meet performance demands and series of layoffs led to employees violating safety regulations. 
A related second theme emanating from these studies pertains to deskilling of operational workers (eg. Hutter, 2001; Cole & Cooper, 2005, 2006). Cole and Cooper (2005, 2006) found that after the privatization of British Railways cost cutting led to discharging older, experienced personal and replacing them by cheaper, but less qualified personnel, which led to an erosion of tacit knowledge and skills. Hutter (2001) also links the accidents with a decline in craftsmanship of operational workers as she mentions the experience of the train drivers involved in the crashes and derailments. 
	These mainly qualitative accident investigations are contradicted by researchers that use quantitative analyses to measure whether safety performances have deteriorated over a longer period of time as compared to the pre NPM regime. Their studies suggest safety levels remained the same or even improved (e.g. Evans, 1994; Cox et al, 2003; De Bruijne et al, 2006). Based on a systematic review of quantitative studies of building, water, paper, cement, bus, rail, mining, electric and gas companies, Egan et al (2007) questioned the empirical base for debates on health and safety implications as they found no robust evidence to link privatization with increased injury rates for employees and customers. Evans (2006), for instance, extrapolated accident rates before privatization to show no statistical evidence existed to support the claim that safety had worsened through privatization. According to Evans (2006: 520) investigations into railway safety after privatization are biased because the main focus lies in determining whether accidents would have occurred had not been privatized, implicitly assuming privatization as the sole cause for accidents and at the same time neglecting the possibility of improvements in safety. 
	In sum: qualitative studies into accidents show prevalence of profits and efficiency over safety and deskilling of operational workers as a by-product of the incorporation of NPM values, while quantitative analyses show stabile or even improving safety performances. This raises the question how these contradictory results can be explained. We will try to do so through a case study in a Dutch utility company. Our first goal is to ascertain whether the introduction of NPM has been accompanied by mechanisms that lead to profits prevailing over safety. Our second goal is to ascertain whether the introduction of NPM has been accompanied by mechanisms of deskilling of operational workers and, if so, how this affects safety. Our main focus lies on risks workers face and not on specific accidents. In other words: we open the black box before an accident occurs. By doing so we want to evade the hindsight bias Evans (2006) refers to by not selecting on a negative dependent variable (cf. Mascini, 2005).






The studies mentioned in the introduction link accidents with the reforms of public utilities that were implemented since the 1980s and commonly referred to as New Public Management. Although the exact meaning of this broad concept is debated, it is usually thought to involve a combination of privatization, decentralization and accountability. Each of these elements has been associated with decreased levels of safety.
Some authors suggest an inherent contradiction between corporate social responsibility and operating in a capitalist environment. Corporate interests and public values are thought to be “competing values” (McNamara en Morris 2008: 569; De Bruin et al 2006). According to Pearce & Tombs (1991, p. 415) the capitalist system in which corporations operate precludes them from operating socially responsible even if they wanted to: ‘We believe that there is an inherent contradiction between, on the one hand, the profit-making goal of business enterprises within competitive capitalism,.. and, on the other hand, the taking of a socially responsible attitude to the consequences of these activities, that is, to their “externalities”’. Privatization forces companies that used to be state owned and sheltered from the market to operate in a capitalist environment. According to Rasmussen (1997, p. 189) this implies a tendency to stretch safety limits: “[c]ommercial success in a competitive environment implies exploitation of the benefit from operating at the fringes of the usual, accepted practice”. Closing in on and exploring the boundaries of the normal and functionally acceptable boundaries of established practice during critical situations necessarily implies the risk of crossing the limits of safe practices”. Operational workers in privatized companies perceive pressure to reach their targets and are prone to taking ‘short cuts’: violating safety rules to save time (Mullen, 2004: 283). In sum: privatized public utilities adopt unsafe work practices because of increased competitive pressure.
Decentralization involves governing at a distance. Governments place less emphasis on dictating rules and enforcing them, but require organizations to make their performance measurable (Power 2003: 188-189). McNamara & Morris (2008: 568) call this the paradox of privatization: governing organizations at a distance leads to bureaucratization because organizations are required to make their output transparent by using performance indicators. This increased accountability is thought to elicit strategic behavior, in the sense that corporations adapt to fulfilling performances they are held accountable for. Espeland & Sauder (2007) call this reactivity, where Power (2003, p. 191) refers to ‘the construction of an “auditable” professional self’. As a result organizations tend to focus on indicators they are judged on and pay less attention to factors that are not measured. Cole and Cooper (2005) demonstrated this in their study of the British Railways’ privatization. The British government had designated the number of warning signals (Signals Passed at Danger, SPAD) as indicator for railway safety performance. Subsequently hundreds of millions were invested in a train protection warning system (TPWS) designed to reduce the consequences of a signal passed at danger. As a result, the number of SPADS decreased. As safety performance improved in this aspect, other safety issues that were not measured were neglected. For example, the introduction of unmanned stations has resulted in a rise in attacks on passengers. The number of robberies, for example, rose by 26% in the year 2001/2002. Other aspects of services, including staffing outside of rush hour and employee education level, were also neglected because they were not quantified as performance indicators. Governing at a distance is therefore associated with worsening safety performances because organizations tend to neglect factors that are not quantified, but are related to safety.
Governing at a distance also means that the government no longer directly supervises companies, but institutes control over the way businesses regulate themselves. This transformation to a system of “control of control” is also known as “enforced self-regulation” (Power 2003: 189). The distance actually offers companies the opportunity to decouple their actual practices from the formal systems controlled by government. Collinson’s research (1999) into a British offshore company shows that increased use of safety performance indicators resulted in temporary workers performing the most dangerous work, tried to conceal incidents and safety violations. When accidents occurred that could not be hidden, they tried to downplay their severity. Management condoned this because otherwise they would miss out on bonuses for safety performance. Gray (2009) also claims governing at a distance causes companies to create the impression that safety is a priority, while actual safety problems are being ignored as long as possible. He compares this with the so-called "Potemkin Villages" that the advisor to the Russian Tsarina Catherine had built to make European sovereigns believe that the country prospered, while in fact there was extreme poverty.
In sum, new public management has been associated with decreased safety levels. Privatization increases the competitive pressures that public service companies face, tempting them to increasingly subordinate corporate social responsibility to profit maximization, while governing a distance has increased the possibilities for doing so.

The energy market
From the 19th century till the 20th century exploitation of energy was considered a ‘natural monopoly’ and controlled by small private firms or local municipalities (Megginson & Netter 2001). Natural monopolies exist where there are economies of scale in production - room for only producer to operate at optimum scale - or economies of scope - when multiple activities are more economically supplied by one firm than by several competing firms. In practice this that natural monopolies exist where there are expensive network investments or ``sunk costs'' (e.g. pipelines, transmission systems and rail infrastructure) (Parker 1999: 213). During the fifties the demand for energy grew explosively. At the same time spurred by the Depression, World War II and the collapse of colonial empires governments started to nationalize utility sectors (Megginson and Netter, 2001:2). The consensus in Europe was that ‘because of the problem of controlling market power, the efficient operation of natural monopolies was most likely to be achieved under state ownership’ (Saal 2002: 2). These utilities grew into large and vertically integrated companies. This entails the controlled generation, distribution and retail of electricity and gas within the same company (Niesten, 2009: 56-57).
	The large state owned vertically integrated utilities that came into existence during the thirty years following the war received increasing criticism for their lack of efficiency. The old system of large vertically integrated public utilities had yielded benefits, mature and secure energy supply systems, but had its drawbacks, high costs and prices than necessary (Niesten 2009;OECD 2000, p. 9). In accordance with neoliberal reforms the solution was thought to lie in the market and three strategies were applied. First, public utilities became privatized and liberalized to establish an open internal market and promote competition. The U.S. and the U.K. being frontrunners Europe soon followed, influenced by EU directives (Clifton et al, 2006). In these liberalized markets public utilities have to compete with each other and newcomers, third parties. Second, the public utilities were vertically unbundled and separated to facilitate competition. This entailed separating potentially competitive segments (e.g. generation, marketing and retail supply) from segments that will continue to be regulated (distribution, transmission, system operations) either structurally through divestiture or functionally by separating affiliates within the same corporation (Joskow, 2006: 12). Third, to ensure free competition, promote efficiency and safeguard public values, regulatory agencies were created that were relatively independent from the state and the previously vertically integrated parent company. This was ‘intented to alter the state’s role to macro-management on establishing the “rules of the game”. Management manages their enterprises with the regulatory constraints of their own’ (Parker, 1999: 216). It can therefore be described as a system of enforced self regulation. 
In practice: The monopoly activities are policed by an industry regulator (Parker, 1999: 213). A system of performance based regulation is put in place (Parker, 1999: 213). Rules were made to safeguard and unify working standards for gas and electric industry (Parker, 1999: 213). Transmission and distribution systems operators were installed, responsible for the operation, maintenance and development of transmission and distribution systems (Niesten, 2009, p. 66). These system operators have to be independent from the generation, distribution and retail activities of the vertically integrated parent company (Niesten, 2009, p. 66). This required accounting unbundling: this entails having separate accounts for generation, transmission and distribution activities to avoid setting new entrants that do not own transmission or distribution systems at a competitive disadvantage (Niesten, 2009: 70). These internal accounts must be made transparent to a regulating/supervising authority (OECD 2000, p. 69). 
In sum, over the past three decades the energy sector has transitioned from large vertically integrated state owned utilities to privatized and separated unbundled companies that compete with each other in a system of enforced self regulation. 

Craftsmanship
In the introduction we mentioned research which links NPM related measures with deskilling. This relationship is usually explained by financial considerations that result in loss of tacit knowledge and skill as experienced workers are replaced by less experienced and cheaper personnel. Thus it remains unclear which mechanisms are involved in such deskilling processes, and how these mechanisms influence workplace safety. We intend to perform a more systematic review by not only taking tacit knowledge into account, but also paying attention to the other two characteristics that fall under the more general heading of craftsmanship: discretion and internal aesthetic. We use Freidson (2001) and Kritzer (2007) to explore the nature of these characteristics. In addition, we use ethnographic case studies into dangerous professions to determine what role craftsmanship plays in relation to safety.  

Tacit knowledge
The knowledge and skill applied by craftsmen is closely related to what Polanyi called tacit knowledge. ‘This type of knowledge is unverbalized, perhaps even unverbalizable, but in any case not part of a formal corpus of codified technique. The acquisition of tacit knowledge is based on experience rather than formal theory. Such skills are learned not in classrooms, but rather during the course of working […]. It is neither formal in character nor systematically articulated (Polanyi 1967)’ (Freidson 1999, p. 25/6). In other words, a significant proportion of the knowledge and skills of craftsmen can not be described by them: a craftsman does these things automatically, without thinking about them (Kritzer, 2007: 327). This tacit knowledge plays an important role in handling risks and is acquired through practice.
The training of craftsmen does not take place in formal institutions, but in the workplace under the supervision of a senior employee in a master apprentice relationship: ‘Recruits to crafts […] learn their craft as they work on the job with a full-fledged member of the trade who serves as teacher and supervisor. The craft is learned as a practical, vocational enterprise in which the working knowledge and tacit skills required are learned as work is being performed’ (Freidson 2001, p. 89). Gherardi and Nicolini (2002) show that during the training of novices on a construction site a lot more value is placed on the development of so-called ‘sensory maps’ than on safety training and education. By seeing, talking, listening, feeling and doing, novices learn to recognize dangers and how to deal with them. Therefore, learning to work safely is not so much a matter of acquiring cognitive knowledge, but rather a matter of gaining experience and involving all senses during this process. By developing ‘sensory maps’ novices gradually master the ‘tacit skills’, that constitute the ‘community of practices’ on a construction site (Gherardi & Nicolini 2002, p. 196). During this learning process, the novice gradually transforms from an unknowing outsider to an expert co-worker through ‘legitimate peripheral participation’. ‘Developing a sense of safety [thus] relies on ineffable and not communicable subtleties mainly derived from the repeated exposure to clues and sensory experiences provided by the unfolding activity, as well as from the linguistic productions that take place during the activity’ (Gherardi & Nicolini 2002, p. 217).

Discretionary specialization
The second characteristic of craftsmanship pertains is discretionary specialization. This involves work of which ‘[…] the tasks and their outcome are believed to be so indeterminate […] as to require attention to the variation to be found in individual cases. And while those whose occupation it is to perform such tasks will almost certainly engage in some routines that can be quite mechanical, it is believed that they must be prepared to be sensitive to the necessity of altering routine for individual circumstances that require discretionary judgement and action’ (Freidson 2001: 23). This is closely related to what Kritzer (2007) calls 'unanticipated problem solving'. This refers to deviations from the routine, which are necessary if something goes wrong or if something unexpected happens. Using his skills and experience the craftsman anticipates and improvises when something unexpected crosses his path. For craftsmen in high-risk occupations real dangers lie in these situations and true craftsmanship represents the answer. It is therefore no surprise that several studies show employees de-emphasize the value of rules and procedures. They feel regulation does not foresee all risky situations and when it does, it does not necessarily mean regulation provides the best answer to handling risks. They argue formal training teaches novices mainly techniques and rules without context, based on ideal circumstances and applicable to every situation Gherardi and Nicolini (2002, p. 202). However, according to lumberjacks, for example, each tree is unique. Therefore, they claim ‘“freedom with responsibility”: freedom to bend rules and take risks and responsibility to do so when necessary’ (Sanne 2008a, p. 648; see also Mascini 2005).
	For example, Brun (1995) showed that linemen sometimes refrain from using mandatory safety goggles claiming they reduce visual contact with electrified components. Moreover, they did not use protective devices aimed to shelter them from accidental contact with electricity at all times because installing and removing them created added risks.  Although management condemned these rule violations, the linemen argued they regained control over their working environment: ‘When we install protective equipment and do our work, we apply our own logic and knowledge… We have no control at all over the protective equipment, all we can do is hope it still works… But when it comes to my own powers, I know I’m still good for a while longer!’ (Brun 1995, p. 819).  Schepens (2005) draws similar conclusions in relation to lumberjacks. For example, safety regulations dictated the use of face shields. According to the lumberjacks, these shields limited their sight, making it impossible for them to see what was happening in the trees. Moreover, noise shields in the helmets limited their hearing ability so they did not notice branches braking off. Lumberjacks perceived the real danger was diminishing of audiovisual contact with the environment instead of not wearing the mandatory personal protection devices.

Internal aesthetic
Craftsmen’s judgment of what constitutes quality and safety has internal characteristics. Kritzer (2007: 325-28) calls this the internal aesthetic of craftwork. With this he means that only a fellow craftsman can recognize the subtle norms or details, which the craft community considers the standard for craftsmanship. Thus the work of an amateur can be distinguished from that of a true craftsman. Freidson (2001: 72-73) calls this occupational control: ‘the determination of qualification for particular kinds of work (and thus of the definition of the work) by the occupation itself’. This internal aesthetic also applies to working safely. Peer contact and the master apprenticeship play a key role. This entails an experienced master pointing novices at risks and demonstrating them how to deal with them. Brooks (2005, p. 808) describes such a relationship in his study on fishermen, namely between skipper and deckhand: ‘Unsafe practices are corrected swiftly and, in the case of a new deckhand, none too gently’. Other studies also show novices are warned about mistakes and dangers harshly. For example, (Gouldner 1954, p. 119) found that older, experienced miners: ‘enjoyed scaring “snowbirds” (as newcomers to the mine were called) […]’. Lumberjacks verbally abuse novices in combination with hitting them on their helmets, to make them aware of the risk surrounding their work environment (Schepens 2005, p. 5). Masters also use accidents to make novices aware of their mistakes. They feel accidents are an effective means by which the consequences of not following advices can be illustrated, precisely because the victims find the consequences to their cost (Schepens 2005, p. 6).
These stringent tactics are not only aimed at correcting or warning novices, but also at testing fellow workers’ stress tolerance. Brun (1995, p. 821) showed linemen deliberately took risks in order ‘to check on each other from time to time’. Haas (1977, p. 162) called this ‘binging’. He showed how high steel ironworkers tested their co-workers’ trustworthiness by constantly baiting and belittling them, a treatment especially reserved for novices. Those who could not take binging were viewed as untrustworthy and consequently were made to quit. Gouldner (1954, p. 134) showed the harsh treatment of co-workers who could not handle binging was especially effective because of the dangerous circumstances in which they worked: ‘Ostracism and isolation were a much more disturbing experience to the deviant in the darkened mine than to a worker in the well lighted surface factory’.






Before we discuss the results of our case study we elaborate on the changes the company has gone through. These changes mirror the developments discussed in paragraph 2. Our research focuses on the crew of a division that is responsible for maintenance and repair. The company originated from a large integrated public utility company. That parent company was vertically unbundled through several structural reforms. We will now briefly discuss those fundamental changes.
First, the parent company was separated from the municipality. Second, it was vertically unbundled into competitive segments, while some divisions came to function as distribution and transmission system operators. We will not differentiate between those system operators and simple call them ‘system operators’. Third, the company’s accounting was unbundled and performance based regulation was incorporated. In practice this means the company charges a large portion of its activities to the systems operators and other divisions. Fourth, the company went through many mergers and takeovers as it grew larger. During these reorganizations a lot of personnel left the company, either through lay-offs or early retirement plans. Fifth, the company harmonized its operational procedures and safety policy. There were a number of reasons for this. The company incorporated government standards, which pertain to working with gas and electric current. These standards dictate the work should be planned, prepared and executed according to fixed procedures, and how responsibilities and competences should be distributed. In addition, the company adopted a system of safety assurance standards for subcontractors, which were developed in the petrochemical industry. It requires a company to have a safety policy, offer safety training, organize safety meetings (toolboxes) and conduct on site inspections. A certifying institution inspects whether companies meet these requirements. The company also instituted a safety department that consisted of health and safety advisors who were responsible for implementing safety procedures. Furthermore, the company invested in formal safety training and education of employees. When they failed these courses they were denied so-called designations and therefore not allowed to perform certain tasks. Ten so-called toolboxes pertaining to safety issues are held each year. Management indicates which topics should be discussed during these toolboxes. Topics commonly discussed include new developments or changes in work methods, materials and equipment. Finally, sanctioning and supervision were used to ensure compliance with safety regulation. Safety experts, team leaders or other supervisors conducted on site inspections. Failure to comply with safety regulation, such as the mandatory wear of protective clothing, can result in a warning, a negative record, a fine or even discharge. 
In sum: The company originated from a large, vertically integrated public utility and has been divided into competitive segments that have to compete witch each other in an open market.  In addition, the company unbundled its accounts and incorporated performance based regulation. Furthermore, the company’s performances are increasingly being regulated and judged by external agencies, in terms of production as well as safety. 

Competing values
We now discuss the results of our case study. In the first section we ascertain whether the introduction of NPM has been accompanied by mechanisms that lead to profits prevailing over safety. Our findings confirm profit maximization and cost reduction can conflict with safety. First, because mechanics experience more work pressure as they are increasingly judged on their output. In the past this was not the case. Today many of the maintenance and repair activities performed by mechanics are charged to other divisions or external parties such as the electricity and gas transmission and distribution systems operators, which used to be part of the parent company prior to vertical unbundling. As a result the organization increasingly focuses on output and production targets. This increases the tendency to take short cuts, since safety measures take more time than unsafe acts. One worker described the workload as follows: "We have do more work in a larger area with fewer people, but at the same time comply with more safety regulations than ever". The most common short cuts are performing repairs under gas pressure or electric current, or performing tasks on their own where safety policy dictates otherwise.
Second, cutting costs on wages and maintenance negatively impacted safety. These developments occurred throughout the energy sector, where companies seek to gain competitive advantages by operating as efficiently as possible. The past decades the company went through numerous reorganizations, mergers, divisions and takeovers. As a result many employees were discharged or retired early, while almost no new personnel were recruited. This led to tighter scheduling and increased workload for remaining workers and, therefore, increased the risk of errors. Maintenance costs were also cut. Overdue maintenance can create unsafe conditions. For example, only those electrical installations were maintained that were the least labor-intensive. This maximized the imbursements the company received from the grid system operators, who compensate per installation maintained instead of time actually spent while performing maintenance. As a result the electrical installations that were neglected started to malfunction due to lack of maintenance. One installation exploded shortly after workers finished switching and closed the door. A 10-kV switching station spontaneously exploded after it short-circuited. The gas discipline also suffers from overdue maintenance. Parts of the network have corroded due to lack of maintenance leading to gas leakages into basements and crawl spaces. An indoor gas leak is one of the most dangerous things for gas workers.

Improvements in safety
Our case study also revealed positive effects: The investments in the bureaucratic safety policy improved workplace safety. The emphasis on regulation reduces uncertainty for employees. For example, safety policy dictates switching electrical installations should be planned by foremen through so-called switching plans. In the past mechanics themselves decided which stations would be switched and in what order, without being certain nobody else was operating on the network. This sometimes resulted in dangerous situations. One mechanic remembered operating on an electricity grid without knowing a contractor was doing the same. The contractor accidently switched the grid on resulting in an explosion. The mechanic and his colleagues barely escaped because they had just finished and left their workplace. Switching plans reduce the risk that such events occur. Designations are another example. Competences are based on diplomas acquired through training and education. This provides better insight into which tasks a mechanic is able to perform. This prevents workers from performing operational procedures for which they lack qualifications and experience. Regulation thus reduces the chance of misunderstandings and hazards. 
In addition, mechanics now have better personal protective equipment. In the past they worked with little or no protective personal protective equipment. Now they have protective clothing, safety shoes, goggles, et cetera. Along with clothing improvements were also made in equipment. Insulated tools and machining equipments, bellows to work without gas pressure and various advanced detectors are just some examples of what mechanics have at their disposal. Safety has improved because of investments in quality and quantity of equipment. 
Furthermore, the attention, regulations and efforts into safety have encouraged risk awareness. What was once common practice is now considered unacceptable. Many employees indicate being more conscious of risks because of the increased emphasis on safety. They sometimes think back in amazement at risks they used to take, for instance, working without personal protective equipment, working in close crawl spaces or covering broken gas pipes with their bodies while performing repairs. Furthermore, employees feel supported by the organization, which invests a lot more in safety than it used to. Therefore, they feel more comfortable refusing to execute unsafe tasks or work under unsafe conditions even when colleagues or supervisors pressure them to do so.

Unintended consequences: blame culture and fatalism
Our third finding was that the intensification of the bureaucratic safety policy - coupled with the increased importance of recording duties, competences and output - has had two unintended consequences negatively affecting workplace safety. The majority of employees feel that the organization has a limited vision of safety that focuses on personal safety – that is risk that can be attributed to individual behaviour by operational workers -, while neglecting non-personal health and safety issues. Working in difficult conditions - such as small, wet and cold crawl spaces, crouching, digging holes, etc. - has taken its toll on employees. Especially older workers experience back and knee problems. In their view, this issue has been neglected for many years by management. In addition, stress and uncertainty due to the many reorganizations have also been neglected. Some employees indicate suffering from stress-related illnesses - including high blood pressure and depression – for which they (partly) blame the turbulent periods during recent years. Next to 'wear' and stress, abuse by customers or bystanders is also mentioned. External safety reports revealed that physical or mental injuries were aggression related in five percent of reported accidents and incidents.
Limiting safety to ‘personal safety’ is closely related to shifting blame and responsibility to individual employees. For example, during training courses much emphasis is placed on compliance with safety regulations; wearing protective clothing, proper use of equipment and refusing unsafe work. During workplace inspections compliance with regulations is enforced and when necessary written reprimands are given. In addition, safe work behavior became part of employee performance evaluations. Furthermore, (near) accidents are discussed at work meetings focusing on whether employees involved complied with safety regulations. According to mechanics this one-sidedly attributes dangerous conditions and accidents to non compliance of employees involved. In their view dangerous situations are preceded by a process that lies beyond the mechanics’ control. When it comes to preparation and planning, for example, sometimes workplaces lack proper materials or drawings and diagrams are incorrect. As a result, mechanics often have to be 'inventive' to get the job done. Such inventiveness can also lead to accidents, as shown by the following example of a gas mechanic connecting pipes. His workplace lacked mounting brackets. To finish his work he went to a hardware store and had make shift mounting brackets made. Later that day he cut his hand on a sharp edges of one of the make shift mounting brackets. He went to the hospital where they cut his tendon. The mechanics feel safety should also be enhanced by improving the entire production process, and should not be restricted to ‘personal safety’.
The perceived imbalance of the safety policy has important implications. The overexposure ‘personal safety’ gives mechanics the impression that through intensifying the bureaucratic safety policy operational personnel are increasingly held personally accountable for safety. At the same time more and more competences, responsibilities and activities are recorded. This has to do with both the administrative requirements of bureaucratic safety policy and the increased administrative pressure due to the transformation of the energy sector. Both developments combine to give mechanics a growing feeling that there is a blame culture. The following exemplifies this. Toolbox meetings play an important role in providing information and training on new procedures and materials. The mechanics have to sign an attendance list. Team leaders say this list is used to ensure all team members receive information about new procedures or materials. The mechanics fear the list could be used against them as evidence when things go wrong involving topics discussed during toolboxes. This would make it easier for managers to exonerate themselves. 
One consequence of this blame culture is that many employees feel the company ‘no longer has their back’ when things go wrong. Moreover, they apply several tactics to evade the increased level of control. For example, they shy away from certain responsibilities and conceal accidents and incidents. Foremen indicate that operational workers are becoming increasingly passive and seem reluctant to take decisive action, especially in situations where there is imminent danger and chance of an emergency, for example, a large breach of gas in a public place. In these situations some mechanics do not take action until their superiors give their consent in person or over the phone (and thus assume full responsibility). Fear of sanctions also contributes to mechanics not always reporting incidents, particularly those incidents where they violated safety rules.
Second, underexposure of risks that lie beyond individual responsibility and control has resulted in fatalism. Because they encounter many unsafe situations they feel should be addressed by the organization but nevertheless are omitted from the safety policy, mechanics feel ‘nothing can be done’ about them. This fatalistic attitude causes mechanics to accept significant risks and carry out dangerous work, especially involving non-personal safety and health risks that are both omitted from official safety policy. Some mechanics no longer bother to report unsafe situations (the so-called incident reports) because they feel the organization will do nothing about when they are not related to ‘personal safety’. When they do report unsafe situations, it is highly symbolic and they often limit themselves to two mandatory incident reports per year.  Such reports often pertain to trivial matters, for example, loose boards in a trailer or an unstable ladder. Thus, incident reporting becomes a bureaucratic ritual instead of a feedback opportunity.

Conclusion
As regards our first research question, we can state the following. First, the transition from a utility company into a commercial enterprise has been accompanied by mechanisms that have a direct negative effect on safety because efficiency considerations have gained in importance over safety considerations. Mechanics feel pressure to perform unsafe acts and cost cutting has worsened their working conditions. Second, our case study also revealed positive effects. Investments in the bureaucratic safety policy improved workplace safety through regulations that reduce uncertainty and through personal protection equipment that offers extra protection, and have, thus, improved safety awareness. Third, the intensification of bureaucratic safety policy combined with increased recording of activities, competences and responsibilities, led to the perception of a blame culture and fatalistic behavior. All in all this leads to the acceptance of unsafe work, strategic behavior and underreporting of incidents and, thus, has a negative impact on safety performance.

Craftsmanship
In this section we discuss our second research question and ascertain whether the introduction of NPM has been accompanied by mechanisms of deskilling of operational workers and, if so, how this affects safety. In the past, most mechanics received their training in a master apprentice relationship. Novices were only allowed to perform certain tasks when an experienced co-worker deemed them capable enough to work on their own. Their senses played an important role too, because back then their equipment was less sophisticated than it is now. So, a mechanic could smell what type of gas leak he was dealing with. The dryness of the earth and the presence of rain worms told him how close he was. However, this process of becoming a craftsman took years, but they acquired extensive knowledge both to work methods and work area. Our case study revealed that the introduction of NPM has been accompanied by mechanisms of deskilling on all three dimensions we distinguished: discretion, tacit knowledge and internal aesthetic.

discretion
Operational workers’ discretion has in recent years been limited by regulation. The relationship with distribution and transmission operators, with whom the organization had previously been united under the flag of the parent company, played a key role in this process. 
In the past, when a mechanic felt that parts of the network had to be replaced he could contact his supervisor who would trust the mechanic’s judgment and often immediately authorized him. Now, a mechanic or foreman first has to get permission from the system operators before they replace parts. Their professional judgment does not suffice, however, as system operators set additional requirements such as photographs, technical measurements and other data. The mechanics feel it takes too much time to provide evidence and data for the need to replace parts of the network. During a meeting attended by one of the researchers, the systems operators complained they hardly receive requests for maintenance, while mechanics indicated they did file reports and request but rarely received a response.  As a result necessary maintenance is still overdue causing malfunctions. As we have previously seen, this can have serious repercussions on public and workplace safety.
The separation with the municipality has also affected discretion. For example, when the organization was a public utility mechanics themselves used to decide when to cut off the gas and electricity in buildings that were about to be demolished. Today it takes much longer before a mechanic can cut off the energy supply because he has to request permission from the municipality. Some demolition companies do not have the patience to wait until the energy supply is cut off. They often demolish buildings with gas and electricity still connected figuring the utility company will come later anyway. They also cause ‘malfunctions’ through sabotage. Then the utility company has no choice but to immediately send a mechanic. Both strategies lead to unsafe conditions for the mechanics. Gas mechanics sometimes find themselves in perilous situations where there has been a considerable gas outburst. 
	Moreover, the intensification of the bureaucratic safety policy has limited discretion. As a result mechanics can not easily depart from safety regulations; even the ones they feel are counterproductive. For example, mandatory use of personal protective equipment is an important feature of the company’s safety policy. Mechanics, however, say there are instances where personal protective equipment adds risk. Mandatory face shields were deemed counterproductive because they condense easily and reduce sight. They also indicate work gloves are uncomfortable and cause them to lose grip, which can be dangerous. Another example is the obligation to wear protective clothing at all times. They feel this is only necessary when there is an outbreak of gas or when they operate on electrical installations, but not, for instance, when they have to dig holes or break up pavement. They also indicate that the warm protective clothing makes them transpire, which adds risk when working with electric current. Wearing protective clothing during the summer can also be exhausting. Temperatures can rise to a point where some mechanics experience loss of concentration, which causes them to forget placing protective fences and fire extinguishers or closing off installations. The following is another example of how the mechanics’ discretion has been limited. In the past mechanics often performed tasks at energy grids and installations, which were under gas pressure or electric current. Nowadays, safety policy prohibits working under gas pressure or electric current as much as possible. For gas mechanics this implies that when, for instance, a gas pipeline is broken and gas escapes, they no longer try to tape or otherwise cover the gap. Instead they have to use bellows at a safe distance in order to perform repairs without being exposed to the burst of gas. This entails digging holes in the ground to place these bellows inside the pipeline. They then blow up the balloons, cutting off the gas supply. This takes considerably longer than directly closing off the source of the gas burst by repairing the gap. During this time the gas continues to flow. The mechanics see this outflow of gas as a source of (added) risk. Under certain conditions it is even considered more dangerous than the brief risk for their own safety when they instantly close off the gap. They have worked for years with gas pressure and therefore feel their craftsmanship enables them to do so when necessity requires it.

Tacit knowledge and experience
The reorganizations in the energy sector and the intensification of the bureaucratic safety policy have eroded tacit knowledge and expertise. In the past decades, the company went through divisions, mergers and takeovers. During this period many mechanics left the company due to layoffs and early retirements. Also, a part of the remaining mechanics swapped the shop floor to non-operational jobs. These developments, combined with several recruiting stops, have led to a shortage in knowledge and expertise amongst the remaining work crew. This lack in knowledge and expertise affects safety. Some parts of the network mechanics operate on can be up to forty years old. Some networks also have a different build-up, which stems from when energy was supplied by local municipalities. While these differences pose an inconvenience for gas mechanics, they can have more serious consequences for electrical engineers. One novice told how he once had to work in an area, which differed from the one he was educated in. In this area a different color sequence was used for wiring. He almost cut the wrong cable. Had he not been warned by a co-worker, he would have been electrocuted. 
In addition, specialization and job outsourcing reduce employees’ oversight and understanding of their work environment. A portion of the tasks originally performed by mechanics have been subcontracted to other divisions or outside parties. Placement of gas meters, for example, is no longer done by the maintenance and repair crews. However, when fixing a malfunction, knowledge of meters can come in handy. Another example: connecting newly build houses to the energy distribution system. This is increasingly subcontracted to private construction companies. In the past the mechanics connected al houses in the area they worked in. This meant they knew the exact build-up of networks in their work area – how conduits and pipes run, where the valves to manually disconnect parts of the system are and what materials have been used. Now this is much less the case. Some mechanics indicate they have little knowledge of the build-up in areas that have been connected by subcontractors. Local knowledge of their work environment has been further reduced because they have to cover bigger and, therefore, less familiar areas as the company grew larger and staffing reduced. Now it may happen that a mechanic knows relatively little about the network in a given area he has to work in. This can cause dangerous situations as mechanics may have to fix a malfunction in a network with unfamiliar structure and components.
Finally, the master apprentice relationship in which novices used to be trained has come under pressure. In the past, newcomers mastered the trade under the guidance of an experienced mechanic. As time passed, novices gradually acquired new competences and responsibilities. Nowadays there is no time for such a lengthy process, which often took years. New personnel have to be employed as soon as possible to maximize chargeable hours. Novices are rewarded competences based on their formal education and training credentials instead of their level of skill and experience, as used to be the case a few decades ago. As a result, these novices sometimes perform tasks beyond their skill and knowledge. According to the more experienced mechanics this lack in experience affects safety. They feel it is expertise and experience rather than formal competences that determine whether someone is competent. One mechanic exemplified this by a tale about a call to a gas smell in an apartment. He searched for hours but could not find the gas leak anywhere inside or near the apartment. Eventually, he found out the gas flow originated far away and reached the apartment through a television cable. Such situations can not be trained in classes, but only learned by years of practical experience. Older and more experienced mechanics especially notice this lack of experience when they revisit the same address a younger colleague visited before them. Gas leaks can be very dangerous if not detected in time. 

Internal esthetic
Our analysis revealed the internal aesthetic has also come under increasing pressure because of reduced supervision, collaboration and social contacts. This was due to increased administrative pressure, focus on individual targets and subcontracting. Thus, the foremen, commonly experienced former mechanics, have seen their workload increase due to the necessity to record (and charge) their activities. This extra administrative pressure resulted from the unbundling of accounts and the emphasis on performance-based regulation.
This increased administrative pressure adds to foremen’s workload. Their function has increasingly become a desk job, which consumes their time. They therefore seldom have time to supervise their work crews or subcontractors.  One of the authors once joined a foreman during a supervision of several sites, worked on by subcontractors. In the blink of an eye he noticed severe mistakes: gas pipes that were bent or pressed against concrete foundations and gas pipes that were laid right underneath telecommunications cables.  Such errors increase the susceptibility of networks and may create hazards. These errors sometimes remain unnoticed because foremen do not have time for their supervisory duties.
	Collaboration and social contacts between mechanics has declined in recent years due to a number of reasons. The mergers and takeovers have created crews that are a mixture of mechanics who have been working together for years and mechanics who have only recently joined the company. These newcomers sometimes remain isolated from the core crew. This is especially true for teams where mergers and acquisitions have taken place relatively recently.
In addition, many mechanics no longer begin their days at assembly or meeting points. Instead they directly travel to their work site to save time. This stems from increased pressure to meet performance demands and individual targets. This has also diminished the willingness to help each other. In the past, when a mechanic’s job was done, he would contact his colleagues to see if anyone needed assistance. This habit is disappearing because nowadays permission must be granted by their foreman, who usually assigns new chargeable tasks to mechanics finishing early. Mutual contacts have thus become less frequent and more superficial. This affects not just work atmosphere, but also safety performance. Social contacts involve more than small talk but also function as an opportunity to exchange information on incidents and solutions to problems. This information gives mechanics a clearer view of what goes on in their work environment and what problems other colleagues face. Social contacts can also function as a platform for technical issues and thus facilitate learning. The decline in social contacts has reduced workers’ knowledge of their surroundings because they have fewer opportunities to share information, knowledge and skills. 

Conclusion
As regards our second research question, we can conclude the following. The introduction of NPM has been accompanied by mechanisms of deskilling that decrease worker control over their environment. First, operational workers’ discretion has been limited by regulations and obligations, which have been imposed by both the systems operators and the company’s safety policy. As a result mechanics have less opportunity to use their judgment in handling risks and controlling their environment. Second, the reorganizations in the energy sector and the intensification of bureaucratic safety policy have eroded tacit knowledge and expertise and strained the master apprenticeship relationship. Third, our analysis revealed the internal aesthetic has also come under increasing pressure because of reduced supervision, less collaboration and fewer social contacts. This was due to increased administrative pressure, focus on individual targets and subcontracting.

4. Conclusion and discussion


Based on our research we can understand why accident inquiries link NPM with degraded safety levels, while quantitative analyses show stabile or even improving safety performances. On the one hand, we have found unsafe work methods and conditions caused by mechanisms related to decentralization, accountability and liberalisation. These mechanisms had both direct and indirect effects on safety. The direct effects consisted of efficiency considerations gaining in importance over safety. The indirect effects consisted of strategic behaviour by employees trying to evade personal responsibility - which they feel is unjustly placed upon them by their employer - and deskilling mechanisms that result from increased regulation.
On the other hand, we have found safety improved because the intensification of the bureaucratic safety policy reduces uncertainty and provides backup for employees so they can resist colleagues pressuring them to work unsafely. This means the utility company has been affected by mechanisms that are related to NPM and can have positive as well as negative effects. It is likely that positive safety effects are ignored in risk inquiries, which take place with the knowledge something went wrong. Quantitative safety studies do not suffer from this bias and can detect these cross pressures because researchers do not limit themselves to organizations where accidents have occurred. The drawback to quantitative studies, however, is that how and why accidents occur remains a black box. Thus, our case study into how employees deal with workplace safety has an added value compared to both quantitative assessments and accident inquiries.
	However, the findings of our study should be considered in the light of its limitations. It remains to be seen to what extent this case study’s findings can be generalized to other companies and contexts. Furthermore, we can not be sure the mechanisms we have attributed to new public management are not actually (in part) related to other changes within the company, which occurred at the same time. Thus it is plausible the intensification of bureaucratic safety policy had more to do with the need for standardization due to mergers and takeovers over the past decades, than with regulatory requirements due to new public management measures. These mergers and takeovers are, however, not unrelated to the liberalization that is part of new public management, as businesses try to cope with the uncertainty of a competitive market through mergers and monopolization ().  To summarize, our study has been exploratory in nature and therefore no definitive conclusions can be drawn. Nevertheless, we feel our research has proven fruitful in three aspects.
	First, our study contradicts studies in which the free market is merely depicted as a source of risk. In these studies operating in a free market necessarily implies companies place profits before safety whenever they can. This in turn presupposes that a more steering role for the state automatically has a negative impact on public as well as worker health and safety.  This assumption ignores the possibility that market forces in some respects and under certain conditions can improve safety performance. Thus, we found the company invested in safety, partly in response to a number of accidents covered by the media. These included an explosion in a mall and a water spill that flushed the shopping centre of Rotterdam - the second city in the Netherlands. It is understandable that companies fear reputational damage resulting from incidents and accidents, especially if their existence depends on customers who can voice their dissatisfaction by switching providers (). Other research has also shown that companies may even insist on strengthening safety and environmental rules to prevent new market players to enter the market (). Just as these previous studies, we demonstrated that it is wrong to assume that market forces automatically degrade safety performance.
	Second, our research points at the importance of conflict and power inequalities in connection with the relationship between risk handling systems and new public management. New public management entails the state decentralize responsibilities for safety to companies as well as individual employees. In the Dutch context over the past decades companies were given greater financial responsibilities for work loss due to illness or disability ().Next to the right to have a safe workplace, individual employees also have obligations to advocate their own safety by using personal protection equipment and refusing unsafe work ().Because employers and employees can no longer shift all financial consequences of work loss on the government, who is to blame for incidents and accidents becomes an important question for both parties. This context helps explain why employees try to evade responsibility and instead point at management responsibilities. According to Silbey (2009) these questions of differentiation and fragmentation are unjustly ignored in research on safety culture, which since the 1980s gained in popularity. Safety culture is generally understood as the sum of the degree to which individual operational employees comply with formal safety policy. Our research into the relationship between new public management and safety affirms Silbey's plea to pay more attention to inequality, conflict and the blame question surrounding incidents and accidents.
	Thirdly, our research is also relevant in the context of the scientific debate on the relationship between new public management and professionalism. Professionals are typically employed in sectors that are connected to the welfare state - for example, teachers, doctors, policemen and judges. Again, the assumption prevails that the introduction of new public management has a negative impact on professionalism. Critics state that administrative pressures due to performance based regulation come at the expense of time spent on their clients by professionals, turn attention towards measurable goals at the expense of other important aspects of professional work (). They also point at diminished learning capacities and collaboration because professionals no longer share experiences about mishaps, as these could damage their reputation(). Furthermore, professional discretion has come under scrutiny from both managers and clients ().However, some studies contradict these findings and offer a more balanced view. For example, Bannink et al (2006) show deprofessionalization can vary according to what type of activity is concerned. Duyvendak et al. () argue deprofessionalization in some aspects can sometimes by accompanied by reprofessionalization in other aspects. For instance, limitation of discretion can sometimes be accompanied by developing management skills. (). This means that research on both workmanship and professionalism pay one-sided attention to negative unintended consequences of new public management and neglect positive or contextual effects. Our study illustrates the importance of not automatically assuming new public management has negative consequences.
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